Descriptive studies on the European Union's global image reveal generally favourable feelings towards the European Union on the part of citizens outside Europe. However, European Union perceptions vary considerably across countries. This article argues that these patterns can be analytically explained by taking context and individual factors into account. European Union behaviour and an individual's supranationalist attitude should exert a substantial impact on citizens' feelings. A multi-level model confirms the expectations. These findings imply practically that the behaviour of the European Union and other International Organizations shapes public opinion and that it might, in the future, negatively influence global public opinion towards the European Union.
Introduction
Recent research demonstrates that political elites outside Europe do not share the (very positive) self-image of the European Union (EU) as a normative and trustworthy power (Chaban et al., 2006; Elgstro¨m, 2007; Sicurelli, 2007, 2008) . Some studies (see, e.g., Pace, 2009 ) have shown that these influence the behaviour of non-European actors towards the EU and its member states negatively. Whilst research on elites sheds at least some light on the causes and consequences of perceptions of the EU, research on the EU's global image has not adequately investigated the attitudes and feelings of the general population. This gap is significant because descriptive research on non-EU citizens' attitudes towards the EU to date has demonstrated that citizens across the globe appear to be quite sympathetic towards the EU but that the level of sympathy strongly varies amongst countries (see, e.g., Chaban and Holland, 2008) . The PEW Global Attitudes Survey further shows that over two-thirds of the citizens of countries outside Europe hold a positive opinion of the EU. However, the percentage of citizens who feel favourable towards the EU ranges from 26% (in Pakistan) to 88% (in Mali).
What factors explain these patterns? Previous research ascribed (elite as well as public) feelings to the EU nearly exclusively to the EU's international behaviour, especially in economic negotiations and cooperation (Chaban and Holland, 2008; Lucarelli, 2007; NCRE, 2007) . In contrast, I argue in this article, first, that non-EU citizens' feelings towards the EU are dependent on, or form a part of, a more general and informed position that individuals take on global and international cooperation and problem solving, which will be labelled supranationalism. Hence, I differentiate between attitudes -which are understood to be rather long-termed, deeply seated and at least basically informed positions -and short-termed, uninformed feelings of citizens. Second, individual characteristics and contextual factors -such as the EU's international behaviour and the EU's relationship with a citizen's country -are crucial in explaining public opinion towards the EU.
I test both parts of the argument using the PEW Global Attitudes Survey data set, supplemented by several contextual indicators. The empirical findings demonstrate that an individual's supranationalist position -measured by individual proxies -has a substantial effect on a non-EU citizen's feelings towards the EU. Additionally, the EU's actions influencing citizens via official developmental assistance (ODA) as well as (in a more restricted way) the EU's behaviour with regard to trade relations and the colonial past between a country and EU member states significantly add to the explanatory power of the individual characteristics.
These findings have two important implications. First, for researchers analysing the effects of public attitudes on governmental preferences (see, e.g., Burstein, 2003; Finke, 2009; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004) , these results indicate that public opinion towards the EU and towards international institutions in general is influenced by both individual and contextual factors. Liberal scholars might interpret the effect of contextual factors as an indication of the fact that public opinion towards international actors might be sufficiently salient to make national governments more likely to take the preferences of their citizenry into account when interacting with international institutions. Second, the results indicate in a more limited and perhaps more convincing interpretation that non-EU citizens also form their feelings towards international organisations by evaluating the actual behaviour of the organisation or by taking the position of national elites towards the organisation as a proxy. This finding appears especially noteworthy for researchers and practitioners focusing on the role of the EU as a norm-diffusing actor in international relations. They should be interested in the fact that the EU's external behaviour actually appears to matter -at least with regard to its image worldwide.
However, this news comes as a finding with contrary implications. Whilst the effect of the EU's spending on ODA might positively influence its future image, the effect of the EU's trade relationships with other countries might be counterproductive in the EU's attempt to position itself as a normatively good and, therefore, legitimate global leading power.
Feelings toward the EU

Actual behaviour matters -Expectations at the contextual level
The EU has long promoted and simultaneously demanded the implementation of democratic and humanitarian norms (for recent analyses, see Freyburg et al., 2009; Fioramonti, 2009; Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Pace, 2009) as well as the deepening of regional integration projects beyond its own borders (De Lombaerde and Schulz, 2009; Hettne and So¨derbaum, 2005) . In general, researchers agree that the EU must be credible and trustworthy to promote its ideas and to be perceived as a leading power (and, therefore, as a role model). However, such a positive perception of the EU is not universally held. Scheipers and Sicurelli have demonstrated that the EU has been regarded as inconsistent in negotiations over the Kyoto protocol as well as in the implementation of the International Criminal Court. This inconsistency, they argue, has led political elites outside Europe to perceive the EU as a not always trustworthy actor (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007) . This perception appears to be especially applicable for political elites from subSaharan Africa (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008) . Elgstro¨m and Chaban et al. point out that political elites across the globe consider the EU a trading power (Chaban et al., 2006; Elgstro¨m, 2007) . However, actors participating in bargaining within the WTO do not conceive the EU to be a leading power. Rather, political actors across the globe are disappointed that the EU strongly urges other countries to open their borders and to abolish tariffs to promote free trade while remaining highly protectionist in regard to European (agrarian) interests (Lucarelli, 2007) . Such a lack of consistency has also been considered a serious problem for the establishment of an effective role for the EU in the democratisation of the Mediterranean region (Pace, 2009: 49) . As one of the few authors addressing this issue, Pace emphasises the high relevance of public opinion for the credibility and, thus, effectiveness of European foreign policy activities. Otherwise, Pace argues, the dissemination of ideas by the EU might again be perceived as a neo-colonial effort to globally promote European or Western values such as liberal democracy (Pace, 2009: 50f.) .
There are only two studies that use systematic and analytical approaches 2 to analysing perceptions of the EU beyond the EU: Lucarelli's 'The External Image of the EU' (Lucarelli, 2007) and the NCRE project initiated by Chaban and Holland. The latter has demonstrated that political elites throughout the AsianPacific and sub-Saharan regions overwhelmingly share negative perceptions of the EU. Whilst the EU has been regarded a successful model of regional economic integration, several criticisms have been lodged against its foreign policy (NCRE, 2007). The uncritical fashion in which the EU interacts with the People's Republic of China particularly worries Asian elites. Additionally, in the conclusion of their project, Chaban and Holland state that the EU is perceived as ''1) an actor whose policy is severely influenced by its own security concerns, [as] 2) a neo-liberal actor in its attitude to the abroad, [and as] 3) a protectionist power'' (Lucarelli, 2007; also NCRE, 2007: Section 12) . Similarly, political elites in Sub-Saharan Africa are worried by the EU's motives and development strategies, perceiving it to be bureaucratic and protectionist (Fioramonti, 2009; also NCRE, 2007 : Section 10 also). Following a similar argument, Hettne and So¨derbaum speak of the EU practicing a form of soft imperialism in areas of inter-regional cooperation. Fioramonti (2009) and So¨derbaum (2007) also emphasise that the EU's approach of strongly connecting developmental aid and economic cooperation to political conditionality is perceived as a forcible dissemination of Western ideas. Both authors argue that such ideas are often perceived as conflicting with a recently resurgent sense of an autonomous and independent African political and cultural tradition.
All of these findings appear to indicate that the image of the EU is strongly connected to its actions, especially in the areas of international economic negotiations and cooperation. Thus, we should expect outcomes, politics and policies to strongly shape public opinion towards the EU. 3 The literature has demonstrated that elite opinion towards the EU is mainly dependent on the EU's behaviour in international economic negotiations and cooperation; hence, citizens' positions should also be shaped by the effects of trade and financial cooperation with the EU (for a similar argument on EU citizens, see Jones and van der Bijl, 2004) . These effects should have a positive influence on the non-EU elites' as well as the citizens' feelings towards the EU if cooperation in trade and finance with the EU is beneficial to the elites' and citizens' country.
Research on elite attitudes has, furthermore, shown that the EU's tendency to grant economic cooperation and financial support only in combination with political coercion is perceived critically, especially in countries which experienced more problematic colonial pasts with member states of the EU (see also McCann, 2003) .
In addition, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the EU and its member states may affect citizens in their everyday lives. In contrast to most other policies, ODA has been connected to cooperation with local civil societies, and thus, the ODA activities of the EU (or its larger member states) might strongly influence citizens' feelings. Especially in very poor and developing countries, the EU (and/or its member states) might be seen as an actor that generously supports the development of these countries by lending technical as well as financial support.
In conclusion, the expectations on the context level can be summarized as follows.
H1a: A non-EU citizen in a country with a higher benefit from trade with the EU should be more likely to have a favourable feeling towards the EU. H1b: A non-EU citizen in a country with a more recent colonial relationship with EU member states and that experienced conflict over the ending of that colonial relationship should be less likely to have a favourable feeling towards the EU.
H1c: A non-EU citizen in a country with a higher dependency on European development assistance should be more likely to have a favourable feeling towards the EU.
Supranationalism matters -Expectations on the individual level
In contrast to the expectations summarized above, I present here an argument for why (in addition to the situational contextual effects of EU behaviour) individual characteristics should be of relevant significance in explaining global public feelings towards the EU. When reviewing the findings on public perceptions of the EU within European countries, it becomes obvious that individual characteristics and attitudes are more strongly shaping the public opinion than the actual behaviour of international actors. Research has demonstrated that European citizens use trust in others, (national) governments and political institutions, identification with the European project and subjective economic expectations as proxies to make up their minds with regard to the (still more often than not unknown) EU, its regional integration process and its organisations. 4 The proposition that citizens evaluate the EU by its actual behaviour appears to be even less likely in countries beyond European borders, where citizens know little about the EU or about their own national political actors' positions towards the EU. Therefore, citizens beyond European borders should even be more likely to use more general attitudes as proxies when asked for their feelings towards the EU.
Hence, I argue that non-EU citizens use their general stance on supranational and international cooperation and problem solving, which I will label 'supranationalism' in the remainder, when expressing their feelings towards the (rather unknown) EU. That is, citizens take their position on supranational and international cooperation in general as a (rational) shortcut to make up their minds about the supranational EU (see, Chapman, 2009; Johns, 2009; Simon, 1985; Sniderman et al., 1991) . This idea is based on the assumption that citizens are increasingly aware of and concerned with problems such as the climate crisis, international terrorism, the financial and economic crises and the global effects of these issues, which have become more relevant over the last 15 years. In this regard, citizens develop an individual position towards international and supranational cooperation and problem solving. If they are favourably disposed towards cooperative politics beyond the nation state in general, they will also display a positive feeling towards supranational or international institutions, such as the UN or the EU. Currently, no indicator exists that directly measures the supranationalism of an individual. However, three indicators have been shown to reflect a supranationalist point of view or at least to cause attitudes or positions that might be considered strongly connected to supranationalism: citizens' attitudes towards free trade, their level of education and their trust in others.
Citizens with a more favourable opinion of supranational and international cooperation in general should also be more positively disposed towards ideas such as free trade, as the latter strengthens cooperation and interdependence among states (Kwon, 2010) . Studies have noted that attitudes towards free trade are strongly and negatively connected to ethnocentrism and nationalism, which can be considered diametrically opposed to supranationalism (Fordham, 2008; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005) . Free trade attitudes also interact positively with citizens' positions towards global powers (Kleinberg and Fordham, 2010) . Therefore, it seems reasonable to treat a citizen's attitudes towards free trade as strongly connected to its supranationalism. Hence, from the viewpoint of the supranationalism argument, we should expect these free trade attitudes -as an indicator of a citizen's degree of supranationalism -to inform non-EU citizens when evaluating the EU (for a related argument, see Machida, 2011) .
Additionally, authors such as Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012), Furia (2005) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) have shown that citizens' level of education strongly predicts whether these citizens display favourable opinions towards global cooperation and problem solving, or at least if they possess more cosmopolitan attitudes and more positive opinions of immigration, multiculturalism and openness towards immigrants. It seems reasonable to argue that education also influences an individual's degree of supranationalism and, thus, his/her feelings towards the EU.
Finally, recent work on economic globalisation and foreign policy attitudes has demonstrated that the generalised trust of individuals leads them to be more open towards supranational economic cooperation and to be more trusting of international actors (Spilker et al., 2012; also Brewer et al., 2004; Schoen, 2007) .
H2a: A non-EU citizen who more strongly agrees with ideas and norms concerning the economic cooperation and openness between countries is more likely to have a favourable feeling towards the EU. H2b: A non-EU citizen with a higher (lower) level of education is more likely to have a favourable (unfavourable) feeling towards the EU. H2c: A non-EU citizen with a higher level of generalised trust is more likely to have a favourable feeling towards the EU. A table summarizing all of these expectations can be found in the web appendix.
Methodology Data
The basic dataset used in this paper is the PEW Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 2007 (PEW 2007) , which includes 47 countries. The number of respondents varies between 500 (Ukraine) and 3142 (China). Because I am only interested in countries outside the EU, the number of countries analysed here is restricted to an overall number of 31 countries 5 and of 28,448 respondents. The PEW data have rarely been used within the scientific community beyond research on anti-Americanism (e.g., Chiozza, 2009; Furia and Lucas, 2008 ; but see also Kleinberg and Fordham, 2010; Shu and Nakamura, 2010) . While less is known about the strengths and weaknesses of these data compared with other surveys (Heath et al., 2005; Norris, 2008; ) , this dataset provides remarkable advantages that largely outweigh the potential problems associated with the lack of study it has received.
6 This survey not only measures public opinion towards the EU within all the countries included but also offers indicators -such as the attitude towards free trade and feelings towards other International Organizations (IOs) -that cannot be found in other data sets. Finally, and in contrast to datasets such as the Gallup Survey 'Voice of the People 2007 ' (Gallup Foundation, 2007 or the Bertelsmann Foundation survey on 'World Powers of the 21st century' (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006) , the PEW dataset provides most of the indicators usually considered necessary to explain political attitudes in general (that is, indicators of political trust as well as socio-demographic indicators). Still, all of the findings will be interpreted cautiously, as it is always appropriate for survey data, especially for data from less-developed contexts (see Seligson, 2005) .
Operationalisation
The dependent variable (eu_eval) was calculated by measuring respondents' favourable and unfavourable feelings towards the EU. The rank order of the original variable was reversed, now ranging from 1 (very unfavourable) to 4 (very favourable). Only including respondents in the calculation who have an opinion towards the EU reduces the number of cases to 23,096 (approximately 81.2% of the original number of cases). While the mean of non-responding citizens per country is 18.8%, there is variance between the countries, ranging from 3.7% of missing values in Jordan to 44.6% in Pakistan. This variance in citizens' knowledge of the EU among countries might cause measurements problems. As clarified below, I address these differences by integrating a control variable at the contextual level.
As the data are situated at two levels and as I wish to demonstrate the effects of both contextual-and individual-level factors, a multi-level model appears appropriate. A calculation of the unconditional intra-class correlation with
where represents the random-intercept variance (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008: 304) , yields a value of the intra-class correlation of .17. This result indicates that 17% of the total variance and, therefore, a non-negligible amount of variance exists between countries (the second level of analysis). Hence, a multi-level regression method will be applied. Additionally, as the dependent variable is categorical, an ordinal logit regression link function would appear to be the first choice. However, tests controlling for the proportional odds assumption that must be fulfilled to run an ordinal logit regression demonstrate that this assumption is violated. In this case, a multinomial regression would seem most appropriate. Nevertheless, there are important disadvantages to such a model, especially in terms of interpretation and application within a multilevel method. I decided to plot the results of a multi-level model applying an ordered logit link function but to control for the violated assumption by, first, applying a multi-level model with a binary logistic link function and by, second, applying a single-level ordered generalised regression model with standard errors clustered around countries. Bank, 2012] ). H1b was more difficult to operationalise because nearly all of the countries surveyed have a colonial past with one of the EU member states. The argument here is that direct remembrance of colonialism must be vivid for it to have a significant effect on respondents' attitudes. Citizens who have experienced a colonial past themselves should still represent a significant part of the population. Hence, I consider it reasonable to attribute the term 'recent colonial past' to all countries that became independent after 1946 (that is, 60 years prior to the year of the survey, 2007). Therefore, the dummy variable capturing the recent colonial past separates countries that have become independent in the last 60 years (¼1) from all other countries (¼0). Because H1b expects an interaction between the recent colonial past and a problematic, i.e., violent, end to colonialism, I additionally coded a dummy variable separating countries that became sovereign following a violent (¼1) or peaceful (¼0) process. The coding was based on data from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2012) and the Library of Congress Country Studies (Library of Congress 2012) as well as countries' official websites. Countries with the value '1' in an interaction of these two colonial variables have a recent and violent colonial past with EU member states. Non-EU citizens within these countries should be more likely to be sceptical towards the EU. The independent variable for H1c was operationalised as the share of the EU's ODA to a country in relation to its total GDP (ODA provided by all European countries, by the European Commission and by the Council of Europe in 2007, data from the OECD [OECD, 2012] ). On the individual level, H2a was operationalised by a question asking for the respondent's attitude towards free trade (with values from 1 ¼ very bad to 4 ¼ very good). To measure the effect of education on non-EU citizens' feelings towards the EU, formulated in H2b, I calculated two dummy variables containing information on the formal education status of the respondents (Lower Education ¼ no or primary education, Higher Education ¼ at least some form of tertiary education). Including two dummy variables instead of one ordinal education variable is necessary given that the ordinal ranking of school education is not exactly comparable across the countries surveyed. H2c is measured by a question asking respondents whether most people in their society are trustworthy. Again, the rank order of the original variable was reversed, now ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
In addition to testing my central argument, I use several control variables. To start with, the dependent variable might be influenced by an additional fourth variable on the second level that has been briefly mentioned above: aggregate knowledge of the EU within a country. We might expect that in countries with greater knowledge of the EU, respondents are more likely to have direct contact with the EU. However, one could either expect that respondents with closer contact with the EU know more about the positive life circumstances within the EU (which could result in a positive effect of greater knowledge of the EU) or know more about the EU's 'iron curtains' when it comes to securing its borders (which may result in a negative effect of greater knowledge). In any case, I control for such possible effects of an uneven distribution of EU knowledge over countries by including a control variable on the contextual level by measuring the percentage of citizens per country with knowledge of the EU (that is, the percentage of citizens able to express a feeling regarding the EU).
On the individual level, it has been noted that, at least for political elites, the religiosity of actors as well as their denomination plays a crucial role in their evaluations of the EU. For example, the openness of the way of life within the EU is a point of criticism amongst Muslim political elites when asked about their attitudes towards the EU (Emerson and Young, 2007 ; but see also Furia and Lucas, 2008) . Additionally, even within the EU, deeply religious Christians and the Catholic Church have displayed scepticism towards the EU's liberal 'way of life' (Jasiewicz, 2004 ; but also Boomgarden and Freire, 2009) . Such effects may also be found on the individual level. Hence, I added a dummy variable labelled 'Islamic denomination' (1 for citizens with an Islamic denomination, 0 otherwise) and an ordinal variable labelled 'religiosity' (from 1 ¼ not religious at all to 4 ¼ very religious) to the equation. Additionally, I control for the age and the gender of the respondents. Being older might be connected to having a greater closed-mindedness and therefore to a more negative feeling towards the EU, while women (especially in some of the developing countries studied here) might be more distant from political life overall and more sceptical towards unknown foreign political actors. Therefore, a gender dummy variable and an ordinal variable measuring the age of respondents (four values, ranging from 1 ¼ 18-30 years to 4 ¼ above 60 years) were added to the equation. All the variables used within the explanatory models are described by common univariate statistics in the web appendix.
Explaining non-EU citizens' feelings towards the EU
Empirical results
To test both parts of the argument, I ran four multi-level regression models with an ordered logit link function. All of the independent and control variables are treated as fixed effects, whilst only the intercept is included as random. The null model is not plotted here. The second model only includes the contextual variables, whilst the third model by contrast exclusively focuses on the independent variables on the individual level. In the fourth model, all variables (including the control variables on the contextual and the individual levels) are taken into account. Table 1 presents the results of these calculations. The findings can be summarised as follows. First, individual effects are highly significant even when controlling for all of the contextual and control variables. Second, indicators at the context level also have a significant effect on citizens' evaluations of the EU. Third, the changes in log likelihoods between the null model and the full model demonstrate that the addition of the independent variables significantly and substantially improves the fit of the empirical model (Likelihood-ratio test: Chi 2 (14): 514.17, Prob > Chi 2 ¼ .000). Fourth, the addition of the contextual variables in particular reduces the variance between countries by half.
In detail, the effects of the individual-level variables appear to be as strong as those predicted by the general argument: the indicators argued to be perceived as proxies for a latent supranationalist attitude of a respondent all exert a significant influence on the respondent's feeling towards the EU -that is, supranationalism actually matters. At the same time, the Islamic denomination of a respondent, his/ her origin in a country with a higher dependence on European ODA as well as the trade relationship between his/her country and the EU and a problematic colonial past of his/her country appear to play equally important roles in affecting the dependent variable.
Yet, the result for the effects on the individual level appears more restricted when the effects of the four individual independent variables are plotted as predicted probabilities. In Figure 1 , I calculated the predicted probabilities of each outcome of the dependent variable. The three black lines signify the cumulative marginal probabilities in relation to values regarding the respective variables (attitude towards free trade, lower education, higher education and general trust). In addition, the grey lines visualize the upper and lower confidence intervals on a 95%-level. The graph demonstrates that the attitudes towards free trade have a substantial and consistent influence on predicting the probability of positive or negative feelings towards the EU. A citizen who is strongly convinced of the benefits of free trade is about 20% more likely to feel favourable towards the EU (y > 2) than a citizen who strongly questions the beneficial effects of free trade. However, higher education, lower education and the amount of general trust by citizens seem to only marginally (if at all) influence the dependent variable.
The actual behaviour of the EU towards the respondent's country also appears to matter. First, living in a country that highly benefits from EU member states' ODA substantially increases the probability of non-EU citizens having a more favourable feeling towards the EU. In a country receiving European ODA to the amount of 4% of its total GDP, a citizen is 1.5 times more likely to feel favourable towards the EU (y > 2) than a citizen in a country which does not at all obtain European ODA. Second, living in a country that exports more than it imports from the EU in general increases the probability of non-EU citizens having a more positive feeling towards the EU. Surprisingly, however, feeling very favourable toward the EU is affected negatively by an increase in exports. Third, the problematic colonial past of a country positively influences the likelihood of respondents liking the EU. In summary, independent variables on the contextual and individual levels exert a substantial impact on feelings towards the EU. Hence, the findings in this article indicate that the actual behaviour of such organisations has a significant and a strong impact on citizens' feelings. Additionally, one proxy variable for an individual attitude, which I have termed supranationalism, also influences a citizen's stance towards IOs. To be sure, some findings appear problematic with respect to the theoretical expectations. Turning to the hypotheses presented at the beginning, one may consider two to have been cautiously confirmed (H1c, 2a), while one of them is contradicted by the data (H1b). The latter addresses the possible effects of a more recent and more problematic colonial connection of a respondent's country with the EU. I argued that living in such a country should make citizens less likely to feel favourable towards the EU. Instead, the data indicate that the relationship might be reversed. That is, people living in a country with a more recent colonial and problematic relationship with the EU are actually more likely to have positive feelings towards the EU. This finding is somewhat puzzling, but it might be explained by two different factors. First, the findings might be the effect of an on-going interdependence between these countries and members or institutions of the EU, the latter in some cases attempting to compensate for previous misdealing with these countries. Second, the findings might indicate that the EU is perceived as a corrective to the national interests of the former European colonial powers of France and especially the UK. As non-EU citizens might learn that the EU interests often deviate especially from UK interests, the EU might be acknowledged as preventing the UK (as the former colonial power) to pursue its interests unilaterally. H2b stating the expectation that higher education levels lead respondents to be more favourable towards the EU is neither confirmed nor rejected. The data indicate that education has a significant influence on citizens' feelings towards the EU but that it exerts -if at all -only a marginal effect. As previous studies have convincingly shown that education is responsible for an individual's supranationalist and open attitude (see especially Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007) , two considerations could be of help in explaining the lack of substantial educational effects. First, one may assume that this lack is due to data problems, such as the possible lack of comparability of educational degrees or advancement across countries. Second, research on the correlation between education and supranationalist attitudes so far has focussed nearly exclusively on citizens of Western countries. These findings might not be generalizable to citizens in other parts of the world.
H1a expected a country's trade relationship with the EU to influence respondents' feelings towards the EU. The data showed a relationship between the independent and dependent variables that confirms the expectations for the three lower values of the dependent variable. However, it also demonstrated an unexpected relationship for the probability of respondents feeling very positively toward the EU. A greater trade benefit in relation to the EU appears to lessen respondents' likelihood of being very much in favour of the EU. Why should citizens in countries that benefit from trade with the EU be more sceptical towards the EU? A short glance at the descriptive data shows that a variety of states, including Russia, South Korea, Bangladesh and several Latin American countries, belongs to the group of countries that have a positive trade relationship with the EU (that is, these countries have more exports than imports). I do not currently have a convincing theoretical explanation for these findings.
Finally, one variable on the individual level that was only included as a control variable exerted a substantial effect. Whether a respondent belongs to the Islamic community or not has a significant effect on his/her favourability towards the EU and also towards the UN. Interpreting this effect, one might resort to a 'clash of civilizations' explanation (Huntington, 1993) . International organisations such as the UN and the EU are perceived in some parts of the world as representing Western and mostly liberal or libertarian values. Such values are interpreted negatively by Islamic respondents who feel threatened by the (perceived) attempts of these institutions to disseminate such values across the globe (see the classical view of Huntington, 1993; but also Emerson and Young, 2007) . Future research might not only be interested in whether these effects of Islamic denomination are individual or contextual effects but what precise causal link actually exists between denomination and citizens' feelings towards international actors.
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Robustness checks
To analyse whether the results presented above are somehow biased by the regression method applied because the proportional odds assumption is violated by the original dependent variable, I recalculated the full model with a multilevel logistic model using a binary dependent variable (with the respondent being favourable coded as 1, otherwise 0). In addition, I also ran a single-level heteroskedastic ordered logistic model that specifically controls for the violated proportional odds assumption. In the single-level model, standard errors were clustered around countries. Both models demonstrate similar effects to those found in the multilevel analysis with an ordinal dependent variable (see the web appendix).
Furthermore, the contextual variable controlling for the citizenry's EU knowledge might crucially interact with two of the independent context variables. We might expect that in countries where citizens have a higher knowledge of the EU, the variables concerning the trade surplus and the country's colonial past should have a stronger impact because more knowledgeable citizens also have a greater insight in the actual behaviour of the EU in international negotiations. Thus, I calculated the full model with additional interaction effects between EU knowledge and trade surplus as well as between EU knowledge and a country's problematic colonial past. Neither of these interaction effects nor the EU knowledge variable has a significant impact on the dependent variable, whilst including the interaction effects into the model leads to the additional loss of significance of the original trade surplus and colonial past variables.
To ensure that the independent variables on the individual level are actually indicators of the respondents' supranationalist positioning, I re-ran the models for a second dependent variable, the respondents' favourability towards the UN (as the most well-known institution representing supranational governance). Before running these models, I recoded the variables on the contextual level. First, the variable 'ratio of trade' now measures a country's trade balance relative to its trade with all states worldwide. Second, the recoded variables controlling for colonial effects additionally capture countries that have been under colonial control by countries outside the EU within the last 60 years. Finally, a country's dependency on ODA is now coded to take into account the amount of ODA that a country receives from all states and institutions worldwide. The results of these UN models, which are plotted in the appendix, confirm the previous findings. Respondents' attitudes towards free trade, lower education and general trust as proxies of a (latent) supranationalist position significantly (although not in all cases strongly) influence the respondents' feelings towards the UN. In addition, the contextual variables, which have been shown to have an impact on respondents' EU feelings -that is, dependency on ODA, a country's benefit or loss from international trade and a problematic colonial past -also influence citizens' feelings towards the UN.
Finally, a basic assumption of the supranationalism argument is that non-EU citizens perceive both organisations as equally distant and thus exert similar feelings -in both cases, based on their general stance towards international and supranational cooperation -towards the EU and the UN. Therefore, it seems relevant to address the question of whether citizens actually perceive both organisations in a similar way or whether they differentiate between the EU (as a distant and foreign actor) and the UN (of which the citizen's country is actually a member). To answer that question, two further checks are employed. First, a spearman rank correlation demonstrates that the bilateral correlation between citizens' feelings towards the EU and the UN is strong and highly significant (Spearman's rho ¼ .5, p < .001). Second, I coded a variable differentiating citizens who feel (very) favourable towards the UN but not towards the EU, and vice versa (eun_diff ¼ 1), from citizens who hold comparable feelings towards the UN and the EU (eun_diff ¼ 0). Over 76% of the non-EU citizens fall in the second category, thus exerting comparable feelings towards the EU and the UN. I re-ran a multilevel model on this new dependent variable which includes individual-level variables from the former models and two recoded context level variables capturing a country's trade and ODA relations (see web appendix). Two indicators significantly influence whether an individual has divergent feelings towards the EU and the UN: EU ODA as a degree of the ODA of all UN countries and the Islamic denomination of an individual. That is, Muslim citizens living in a country that receives more European ODA in relation to ODA from all UN member states seem to be most likely to differentiate between their feelings towards the UN and towards the EU.
Still, none of the other individual-level or context-level variables influence a non-EU citizen's differentiation between the EU and the UN. The findings therefore indicate that, first, the vast majority of non-EU citizens does not distinguish between the organisations, and, second, the indicators connected to a citizen's supranationalist position are unrelated to this distinction. This finding gives further credence to the argument that non-EU citizens' feelings towards divergent international and supranational actors are informed similarly by their stance towards supranational and international cooperation and problem solving.
Conclusion
This article started from the observation that public opinion towards the EU is in general quite favourable but that the degrees of EU sympathy vary across countries. I argued that the unexpected favourability in general and the variation over countries can be explained not only by including contextual variables at the country level but also by turning to an individualistic conception of a person's supranationalism.
Briefly summarising the results of a multilevel model as well as robustness checks, the analysis supports my argument. Beside the substantial effect of citizens' attitudes toward free trade as a proxy for their general position towards international and supranational cooperation, contextual-level variables also matter. A country's dependence on ODA distributed by the EU or its member countries as well as -to a lesser degree -trade with the EU and a country's historical past with the EU significantly influences the probability of respondents being more favourable towards the EU.
Because little research has been conducted regarding public perceptions of the EU as a global normative power, the work presented in this article should be understood as an initial, though significant, step in explaining non-EU citizens' feelings towards the EU. Whilst the findings presented should be considered as the basis for further theoretical and empirical elaboration, they generate three theoretical implications.
First, authors focusing on the legitimacy of IOs as such (see again Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Spilker et al., 2012; also Keohane, 2011; Zu¨rn, 2004) should be interested in the fact that feelings towards different IOs can be explained by similar independent variables. Thus, perceptions of an IO's legitimacy might be improved (or worsened) by the IO's behaviour, but they are also dependent on citizens' individual attitudes.
Second, from a liberal perspective, researchers analysing public opinion regarding international politics and its effects on governmental decision-making should be interested in knowing that the actual behaviour of the EU in international (economic) negotiations and cooperation influences the feelings of non-EU citizens. One interpretation of this finding includes the argument that national elites must take account of the citizens' majority position when dealing with the EU, as the actual behaviour of the EU seems to be sufficiently salient to concern non-EU citizens. A second and probably more convincing interpretation, however, argues that the effects of the EU's behaviour on the respondent's EU feelings are mediated by elites. That is, if a country's elites perceive the EU's behaviour to be negative (and, therefore, hesitate to cooperate with the EU), they will attempt to convince citizens that the EU is a negative influence.
Third, based on the interpretation of contextual-level effects as elite-induced effects, authors who are more interested in the EU's self-conception as a wielder of 'soft power' or 'normative power' (Nye, 2004 ; also see Aggesstam, 2008; Manners, 2002 ; critically: Hyde-Price, 2006) might be puzzled by these results. The EU is widely perceived in a favourable light by citizens across the globe. Normatively, this may contribute to a relatively high degree of acceptance of the EU and its actions. Such acceptance is necessary for an actor aiming to diffuse norms, including actions that interfere in domestic behaviour to promote norms and values of good governance. However, the consequences of the -direct or eliteinduced -effects of the actual trade relationship on citizens' feeling towards the EU might worry researchers and practitioners from a normative standpoint. The EU trade relationship with a specific country has an impact on respondents' feelings towards the EU. Assuming that the general direction of the effects is correctly captured by these findings, it seems reasonable to state that if the country exports more to the EU than it imports, its citizens are more likely to feel favourable towards the European organisation. Inversely, the graph in Figure 2 also indicates that the more negative a country's trade relationship, the more likely the respondents are to feel unfavourably towards the EU. This finding appears even more important because most of the countries import much more from the EU than they export to it. That is, the trade effect in most of the countries may make citizens more sceptical towards the EU. Under the assumption that the EU does not wish to alter this situation, its current attempts to improve its ability to diffuse norms and values by obtaining a more prominent profile in world politics might be counterproductive. An increase in the EU's public profile (especially in countries with a trade deficit with the EU) may increase global scepticism towards the EU.
Again, the three implications outlined above should be understood as promising starting points for future research on the ground of more advanced data. Still, the results of previous research focussing on elite perceptions of the EU and the findings reported in this article indicate that the EU has to continue its attempts to convince both non-EU elites and citizens of the positive nature of the EU. Hence, the need for ''a more coherent EU approach to public diplomacy seems undeniable'' (Chaban et al., 2006: 262) .
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Notes
1. This finding is interesting, as the research on citizens' attitudes towards the US as a 'hard' power has long been an issue of interest (for recent research, see Chiozza, 2009; Isernia, 2006) . Due to theoretical research on the legitimacy of international institutions (Keohane, 2011; Zu¨rn, 2004) , even the attitudes of citizens towards the United Nations have recently been the topic of analytical research (see Constantelos and Diven, 2010; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011) . 2. Furthermore, an empirical study of perceptions of the EU was performed amongst Chinese scholars and university students (Liqun, 2008) . However, its main finding was that both Chinese scholars and students are very fond of the constructive role of the European Union but that this fondness may be biased by some 'sort of wishful thinking' (Liqun, 2008:169) . Additional studies have addressed or at least provided indicators of interest for research on citizens' views of the EU beyond European borders. However, these data usually lack indicators regarding the general political attitudes of the respondents and sometimes fail to provide socio-demographic indicators of the respondents by which to explain these attitudes. Such is the case for the Bertelsmann Foundation's research on World Powers in the 21st century (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006) and Gallup International's Voice of the People survey in 2007 (Gallup Foundation, 2007) . Therefore, to my knowledge, no analytical study has been undertaken of the sources of EU support outside European borders based on the data from these studies. 3. That is not necessarily to say that citizens have actual knowledge of the EU and, therefore, evaluate it in relation to its actual behaviour. The argument for contextual effects on citizens' feelings might also be that, due to their incomplete knowledge of the EU, citizens merely adopt the more informed attitudes of their nation's elites when forming their feelings about the EU (for more on the argument of cue-taking, see Anderson, 1998; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Steenbergen et al., 2007) . 4. For a necessarily limited overview on the topic of Euroscepticism and attitudes toward European regional integration in more general, see Anderson, 1998; Boomgarden et al., 2011; Constantelos and Diven, 2010; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Herzog and Tucker, 2009; McLaren, 2007 . For interaction effects between the country and the individual levels, see Garry and Tilley, 2009; Rohrschneider and Loveless, 2010; Steenbergen et al., 2007. 5 . The countries included are Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine and Venezuela. In addition to the EU countries, the test excluded China, Morocco, Egypt and the Palestinian territories due to missing data on the contextual or individual level. Finally, I had to drop the US and Canada due to another missing data problem. Checks revealed that there are actually no observations in these countries containing answers to all questions measuring the independent variables on the individual level. This is due to the fact that the questionnaire was split in two divergent forms in both countries, ascribing different questions of the survey to different parts of the sample. 6. However, the methodological information given by the PEW Global Attitudes Project for every survey is very informative in this regard. There are differences in modes of surveying (face-to-face via telephone) and sampling design as well as problems with the oversampling of urban areas in some countries. Unfortunately, these problems are common in most cross-regional survey research (especially in research outside Europe). To be sure to include all of the information at hand to overcome these measurement issues, I weighted the data by the design weight provided by the PEW Global Attitudes Survey. 7. Such a procedure appears to fully account for the problems generated by the violation of the proportional odds assumption. For one, Bender and Grouven (1998) have recommended the use of binary logistic models for ordinal data with nonproportional odds. Whilst they propose the calculation of binary logistic models for each two values of the ordinal variable (for example, 2 vs. 1 and 3 vs. 2), I apply only one (multi-level form of) binary logistic regression using the changed version of the dependent variable. Additionally, Williams (2010) has introduced a form of ordinal generalised linear model called oglm, which is less restrictive towards the proportional odds assumption than the usual ordinal logistic model and which can even fit a heteroskedastic ordered logistic regression model. The latter actually estimates an equation for determinants of the outcome and an equation for determinants of the residual variance (Williams, 2010: 544f.) . Therefore, I apply this heteroskedastic model after identifying the variables that violate the proportional odds (or parallel regression lines) assumption. 8. I wish to thank one of the reviewers for pointing me to this interpretation. 9. It appears to be possible that a respondent's location in the Middle East region has a fundamental impact on his/her feelings towards the EU or the UN. However, attempting to control for different regions by including dummies for several regions resulted in the model not converging. Still, future research with more elaborated data should include variables controlling for regional effects as it seems plausible that attitudes might be explained differently across regions, with country and individual effects varying in relevance across regions. For example, feelings towards the EU in Southeast Asia might be strongly shaped by the behaviour of the EU towards China, while citizens in Africa are much more affected by the EU's policy of distributing and providing developmental aid. 
